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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article surveys real property for the period October 1, 1995
through September 30, 1996. This Survey does not include every
real property case decided during the Survey period; rather, it in-
cludes only ones the authors thought were important or interesting
enough to be included. Generally, we would not consider any of the
cases remarkable but what we do consider as noteworthy is the fact that
there are fewer "good" cases from which to select. In fact, there are just
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fewer cases. Certainly, this is a direct result of alternative dispute resolu-
tion and represents a positive trend in the practice of law.
II. LENDING
A. MORTGAGES
Bonilla v. Roberson' considered the powers a trustee does not possess
under a deed of trust. In 1980 Richard Roberson sold two lots to Felipe
Bonilla. One lot contained a building with four rental units, and the
other lot was vacant. Bonilla executed a promissory note for each lot,
and each note was secured by a deed of trust in favor of Roberson. The
deeds of trust contained the usual clauses requiring Bonilla to pay ad
valorem taxes and maintain insurance on the two lots. In 1984, after
Bonilla defaulted on the notes by failing to make mortgage payments and
further defaulted under the deeds of trust by failing to pay taxes and
maintain insurance, Roberson initiated non-judicial foreclosure sales of
the lots covered by the two deeds of trust. Roberson bid and purchased
the lots for amounts in excess of that owed on the notes. 2 Bonilla filed
suit to recover the excess amount. After the foreclosure sale Roberson
inspected the property and found the rental building damaged, thus ren-
dering the units untenantable. Four days after suit was filed Roberson
and the trustee (Roberson's father) rescinded the first sale and filed can-
cellation deeds. At a second foreclosure sale Roberson submitted suc-
cessful bids in amounts considerably less than the original foreclosure
sale. A non-jury trial upheld the second foreclosure sale and rendered
judgment in favor of Roberson, even though the first sale compiled with
all statutory requirements.3
On appeal Bonilla contested rescission of the original foreclosure sale,
arguing that the original sale was valid and the subsequent cancellation
deeds were invalid. The court of appeals stated that foreclosure under a
deed of trust is a harsh remedy and a trustee should insure that foreclo-
sures are conducted in strict compliance with the deed of trust and condi-
tions of sale.4 Furthermore, the trustee acts as agent for both parties and
must act impartially to achieve the trust's objectives; however, a trustee
has only limited authority to act as the mortgagor's agent in connection
with the foreclosure sale.5 The court discussed the trustee's role in a fore-
closure sale and determined that a trustee does not have the power to
execute a cancellation instrument purporting to take back title to the
property and resurrect the underlying debt. In fact, said the court, to
imply such a power would give powers never specified or contemplated
1. 918 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).
2. The amounts loaned were $51,500 for the lot with the building and $9,000 for the
vacant lot. The foreclosure bid was $60,000 for the lot with the building and $20,000 for the
vacant lot. Id. at 19.
3. At trial Roberson sought $69,700.00 in lost rental income in addition to the defi-
ciency. The trial court awarded him $18,706.11. Id. at 20.




by the deed of trust.6 Certainly, the court of appeals reached the right
result, but it should be noted that the mortgagee son could have sued the
trustee father to set aside the sale for breach of the "Father Knows Best"
doctrine.
B. FORECLOSURE
In Reyna v. State National Bank of Iowa Park7 the court considered
(but denied) a debtor's request "to have his cake and eat it, too." Reyna
was a partner in a construction company with his brother and father. Af-
ter his father's death, Reyna, as representative of Reyna Construction,
executed an extension of several promissory notes in favor of State Na-
tional Bank. The notes were secured by Reyna's home. Despite the ex-
tension, Reyna defaulted on the loans. In an attempt to meet the
payment schedule, Reyna asked permission to sell some of the company's
equipment and apply the proceeds towards the notes; however, Reyna
then missed his second payment. At that time, State National sent a ten
day notice of intent to accelerate the notes. Reyna responded by mailing
in his payment, but State National proceeded with the acceleration and
then foreclosed its lien on Reyna's home. Reyna sued, and judgment was
entered in favor of State National.
On appeal, Reyna complained that the trial court erred by refusing to
set aside the foreclosure, since it was undisputed that State National did
not send the twenty day notice required by law. 8 The court concluded
that Reyna could not bring an action seeking damages for wrongful fore-
closure and an action for rescission of the foreclosure sale. Since the jury
had awarded damages for the wrongful foreclosure, the court would not
permit a windfall to Reyna, especially since Reyna had full possession of
the residence rent-free from the date of foreclosure. 9
C. USURY
Lentino v. Cullen Center Bank and Trust'0 considered the effect of
usury that results when a lender requires, as a condition to making a loan,
that the borrower assume a third party's debt. In 1982, Eduardo and
Jorge Lentino each individually executed separate promissory notes for
$150,000 to Cullen Bank. Both notes were renewed in 1983, and in 1984
Eduardo and Jorge, along with four other parties, jointly and severally,
executed a new promissory note to Cullen Bank in the amount of
$2,252,250. Eduardo and Jorge also executed guarantee agreements un-
conditionally guaranteeing payment of the 1984 note, although no addi-
6. Id. at 22.
7. 911 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
8. See TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 1995).
9. Reyna, 911 S.W.2d at 855. The proper measure of damages for wrongful foreclo-
sure is the difference between the fair market value of the land at the time of foreclosure
and the amount received at the foreclosure sale. Id.
10. 919 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
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tional funds were advanced to Eduardo and Jorge as consideration for
increasing their obligation. Subsequently, Cullen Bank filed separate
suits against Eduardo and Jorge for defaulting on the 1984 loan. In 1987
Eduardo and Jorge both entered into settlement agreements with Cullen
Bank, which included new notes."
Eduardo and Jorge both defaulted on the 1987 notes and Cullen Bank
sued to collect on these notes. The trial court entered final judgment in
favor of Cullen Bank. During postjudgment discovery, Cullen Bank al-
legedly discovered fraudulent transfers by Jorge and Eduardo and subse-
quently filed another suit based on these discoveries. Eduardo and Jorge
filed a response claiming several affirmative defenses, including usury.
Eduardo and Jorge also filed counterclaims alleging usury. Cullen Bank
filed a motion for partial summary judgment requesting the trial court to
hold that the 1987 settlement agreements barred Eduardo and Jorge's
counterclaims and affirmative defenses. The trial court granted Cullen
Banks' motion. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that a fact issue
existed as to whether the 1984 note obligated Eduardo and Jorge to pay
interest exceeding the maximum lawful rate.12
Eduardo and Jorge argued that the 1984 note was usurious, therefore,
the settlement agreements were void since they failed to purge the usury
contained in the 1984 note. They also argued that summary judgment
could not be based on a void instrument. In agreeing with this argument,
the court relied upon Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold13 which held that
"[w]hen a lender requires, as a condition to making a loan, that a bor-
rower assume a third party's debt, such debt must be included in the in-
terest computation to determine usury.' 4 As previously mentioned,
Cullen Bank conditioned the renewal of the 1983 note upon Eduardo and
Jorge's agreement to be jointly and severally liable with third parties for
the total sum of the 1984 note. This 1984 note had a one-year maturity,
and Cullen Bank did not advance any funds to Eduardo and Jorge except
for the original $150,000 loan.'5 Thus, the court found that the computed
interest on the 1984 note under Alamo Lumber likely exceeded two mil-
lion dollars for one year, even though no more than $150,000 was ever
received from Cullen Bank.16 It does not take a mathematician to deter-
mine that this amount was greater than the maximum lawful rate of inter-
est of 24% at that time (the rate was closer to 1500%). The court noted
11. Under the settlement agreements, Eduardo and Jorge agreed that
(1) [Cullen Bank] would pay ... each $10 and release them of their joint and
several liability under the 1984 note and guaranty agreements; (2) if [they]
defaulted on their notes, the defaulting party could be liable for the out-
standing balance on the original 1984 note; and (3) [they] waived all affirma-
tive defenses and causes of action relating to the loan documents in the
underlying lawsuit.
Id. at 744.
12. Id. at 746.
13. 661 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1983).





that when the original usurious obligation extends into the subsequent
settlement agreements, the subsequent settlement agreements will be
void and unenforceable. 17 The court does indicate that the bank could
have taken a different route and avoid this result; i.e. purging the settle-
ment instrument of usury contained in the underlying rate. This can be
done by cancelling the obligation tainted by usury and creating a new
obligation free of usury.
In William C. Dear & Associates, Inc. v. Plastronics, Inc.,18 the court
made a no-nonsense decision in favor of Plastronics. The controversy
arose from investigatory services performed by Dear on behalf of Plas-
tronics. An invoice was sent to Plastronics itemizing the outstanding debt
and amount of interest that accrued thereon from May 1992 through Oc-
tober 1992. As disclosed on the invoice, and conceded by Dear, the inter-
est charged was one percent per month, compounded monthly. Dear
instituted this appeal from a final summary judgment in favor of Plastron-
ics. 19 The appeals court had no trouble affirming the trial court summary
judgment regarding the usury issues.20 There was no agreement between
the parties specifying an applicable rate of interest, and under those cir-
cumstances, the relevant statute permitted Dear to charge Plastronics
simple interest at six percent per annum.2' The court calculated the inter-
est and determined that the entire amount of interest charged on the No-
vember invoice equalled $2,990.62, while the Code allowed Dear to
receive approximately $1,458.36.22 Dear argued that article 5069-1.06,23
applied by the trial court, did not apply to transactions like the one in
question. Again, the court did not play around with this argument and
stated that the application of article 5069-1.06 was beyond doubt. 24 The
court held that the charge represented a fee for withholding payment,
and this was nothing more than compensation for the detention of money
purportedly due, which is "interest" under article 5069-1.06 of the civil
statutes.25 Although not a "real estate" case, a key point made by the
court (applicable in real estate transactions) is that "a creditor need not
have the specific intent to charge usury to violate the usury statutes, he
need only intend to charge the rate charged." This raises the question of
what affect this might have on a usury savings clause which might other-
wise have been upheld.
17. Id. at 747.
18. 913 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied).
19. The final summary judgment awarded Plastronics $9,375.11. "The sum consisted
of three times the amount of interest charged in excess of that allowed by law, that is,
$4,375.11, plus attorney's fees of $5,000.00." Id. at 253.
20. Id.
21. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1987).
22. Plastronics, 913 S.W.2d at 253.
23. Article 5069-1.06 sets for the penalties for any person who charges interest greater
than the amount allowed by the statute. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(a)(Vernon 1987). "Interest" is defined as compensation for the use, forbearance, or deten-
tion of money. Id. art. 5069-1.01(a).





Cases concerning guaranty agreements were scarce this Survey Period.
Bishop v. National Loan Investors, L.P.26 focused on the effect of an un-
conditional guarantee and notice requirements regarding foreclosure on
secured realty. In September of 1990, Dan Royall, Jr., borrowed
$41,261.17 from Kerens Bank to purchase property. Later that year, Phil-
lip R. Bishop signed a guaranty agreement regarding the note. Royall
also had an outstanding 1987 loan with Kerens Bank. The guaranty spe-
cifically stated that it did not apply to other debts that Royall had with
Kerens Bank. Thereafter, the FDIC took control of the bank at the time
Kerens Bank became insolvent. National Loan Investors, L.P. (NLI)
then acquired both the 1987 and 1990 notes from the FDIC. After Royall
defaulted on the 1990 note, NLI filed suit to collect the 1990 note from
Bishop based on his status as guarantor. During this same time period,
NLI sold the land securing the 1987 note and also filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment on the Bishop lawsuit. Bishop claimed that NLI should
have sued Royall first and that NLI failed to properly notify him before
selling the collateral securing the 1990 note. Summary judgment was
granted in favor of NLI.
On appeal, Bishop relied on the Texas Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) to support his claims.27 With regard to Bishop's first argument
that NLI should have sued Royall first, the court of appeals concluded
that the 1990 note placed no conditions on the guarantee agreement
thereby making Bishop an unconditional guarantor.28 As an uncondi-
tional guarantor, Bishop was primarily liable for the debt and waived any
requirement that the holder take action against the maker as a condition
precedent to his liability.29 In striking down Bishop's second argument
regarding the notice of foreclosure sale, the court pointed out that the
1990 note was not secured by the 1987 deed of trust against the foreclosed
property since the two documents involved different parties. 30 Addition-
ally, the court indicated that even if the 1990 note had been secured by
the real property, the UCC's notice provision did not apply to "guaran-
tors secured by realty."'31
26. 915 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
27. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 34.02(a)'& (b)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1987)(requiring that if a surety to a contract requires that the obligee sue on the contract, the
obligee must sue the obligor during the first term of court after receiving the notice, or
during the second term showing good cause for the delay); Id § 9.504(c) (Vernon 1991)(providing that a secured party must notify the debtor of the collateral's sale).
28. Bishop, 915 S.W.2d at 244.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 245. The 1987 deed of trust secured any future debts of Royall and Gatlin;
the note involved Royall only. Id.
31. Id.; TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.104(10) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1988) (indi-
cating that the UCC expressly omits governance over "the creation or transfer or an inter-




National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Olson32 dealt with the issue of
whether a surviving minor child's mere existence would cause a home-
stead to descend free of a decedent's debt. The decedent died testate
survived by his son, Judd Olson, and minor daughter, Stephanie Olson.
The son acted as independent executor and inherited his father's home-
stead. The decedent's estate was insolvent and owed National Union
over $750,000. To secure payment of this debt, National Union requested
a judgment lien against the homestead property, arguing that the prop-
erty was non-exempt real estate. Judd Olson filed a declaratory judgment
action seeking a declaration that because the decedent had a minor child
at the time of his death, the homestead passed to him as devisee free and
clear of National Union's claim. The probate court granted summary
judgment in favor of Judd Olson and National Union appealed.
National Union urged' the appellate court to condition the exempt na-
ture of the homestead upon Stephanie's actual occupancy of the home-
stead. Stephanie had lived with her mother since her parents' divorce in
1989. Affirming the probate court, the appeals court referenced the
Texas Constitution and the Texas Probate Code, which indicate that a
determination of whether homestead property is exempt from satisfac-
tion of the decedent's debts turn upon whether the decedent is survived
by a spouse, minor child, or unmarried adult child residing with the fam-
ily.3 3 The court stated that the right to occupy the homestead and the
right to receive the homestead debt free were separate and independent
rights. 34 Regardless of whether Stephanie exercised her right to occupy
the homestead, the homestead passed exempt from creditors; once this
exempt status is established, the homestead never becomes subject to
debt.35 Lastly, since Stephanie's existence determined the homestead's
exempt status, that status was immediately ascertainable upon the dece-
dent's death and, by definition, post mortem events have no effect on the
homestead's exempt status.36
Another case dealing with homestead issues attempted to reconcile a
1991 Texas Supreme Court'case with prior case law establishing that a
party's dispossession from his homestead by judicial act does not defeat
his homestead rights. In Lawrence v. Lawrence3 7 the court of appeals
denied the defendant's affirmative defense of homestead. Irene and John
Lawrence were divorced in 1988. The decree awarded ten acres of land
to John as his separate property. The decree awarded Irene both a
$50,000 judgment against John and the exclusive use and right of occu-
pancy of the tract awarded to him as separate property. Irene filed a
32. 920 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
33. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 52; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 279 (Vernon 1980).
34. National Union, 920 S.W.2d at 462.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 911 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied).
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judgment lien against the property when the decree was signed. Later
that month, John conveyed the ten acre tract to his son, John Lawrence,
Jr. Irene then filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming that her judg-
ment lien attached to the land. In response, the son argued that the prop-
erty had been his father's homestead and that he had become his
successor in interest. The trial court granted Irene's partial summary
judgment.
On appeal, John Lawrence, Jr. relied upon the holdings in Posey v.
Commercial National Bank38 and Speer & Goodnight v. Sykes39 to assert
his affirmative defense of homestead. The appeals court politely pointed
out that Laster v. First Huntsville Properties Co.40 effectively overruled
both Posey and Speer.41 Based upon the explicit and unambiguous lan-
guage of the Laster opinion, the appeals court concluded "that one who
holds only a future interest in property with no present right of posses-
sion cannot claim a homestead right in the property, regardless of how he
was dispossessed. '42 The divorce court ousted the father from possession
of the ten acre tract by granting a life estate in the property to Irene
Lawrence. Therefore, John Lawrence, Sr. only had a future interest in
the property and without a present possessory interest was not entitled to
homestead exemption. That being the case, as a matter of law, John Law-
rence, Jr. could not be a successor to a homestead defense. 43
IV. DEEDS/DEDICATIONS
In Russell v. City of Bryan" the Houston Court of Appeals considered
whether the words "dedicate" and "dedication" in a dedication instru-
ment compelled the conclusion that the grantor intended to merely con-
vey an easement permitting use of land as a park so as to retain
ownership of the fee, including minerals, in the grantor. In 1925, Tyler
Haswell dedicated a tract of land to the City of Bryan for use as a park.
In 1981 the City leased the mineral rights to North Central Oil Company.
In 1978, however, Haswell's daughter had conveyed all of the rights, title
and interest in and to any mineral or royalty interest she owned in Brazos
County to John M. Lawrence, which would include the park. Lawrence
then conveyed fractional shares of interests to Michele Russell and Inter-
venors. Russell and Intervenors sued the City for declaratory judgment
and conversion claiming ownership of the minerals under the park
through Haswell. A jury found that Haswell intended to convey to the
City more than merely the right to use the park's surface land.
Affirming the trial court judgment, the court of appeals disagreed with
the appellants' contentions that the term "dedication" was synonymous
38. 55 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, judgm't adopted).
39. 119 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex. 1909).
40. 826 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1991).
41. Lawrence, 911 S.W.2d at 453.
42. 1d.
43. Id. at 454.
44. 919 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
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with "easement." 45 "'Dedication' is defined as '[t]he appropriation of
land, or an easement therein, by the owner, for the use of the public, and
accepted for such use by or on behalf of the public.' 4 6 "Thus, the key is
public use, and a fee simple estate, or a lesser estate such as an easement,
can be conveyed." 47 The court agreed with the City that Haswell's use of
the term "dedication" only indicated "why" the property was conveyed,
not "what" was conveyed.48 Thereafter, the court concluded that the ex-
tent of the estate conveyed in a dedication by deed is determined by the
grantor's intent; when the deed is ambiguous, examination may be made
of circumstances surrounding the deed's execution, as well as other ac-
tions from which the grantor's intent may be implied.49
Houston Lighting and Power Co. v. State50 involved the evaluation of
dedication law with respect to a public utility easement. Both the State
and Houston Lighting and Power (HL&P) filed petitions for declaratory
judgment concerning the State's duty to reimburse HL&P for the cost of
relocating electric facilities in three locations. HL&P had its electric dis-
tribution service installed in three public utility easements dedicated by
subdivision plats prior to displacement by the State for roads. TWo of
HL&P's utilities occupied dedicated public utility easements parallel to
roads which were widened by the State. The State acquired the lots,
which included within their boundaries the dedicated public utility ease-
ments. HL&P was ordered to relocate its utilities and did so. The State
then built a barrier on U.S. Highway 59 necessitating the raising of the
power lines by HL&P that were on a dedicated public utility easement.
This was a case of first impression, since there were no Texas cases
directly concerning a State taking a dedicated public utility easement
from a utility that had used the easement for public purposes. The court
ruled that HL&P had acquired an easement by estoppel in pais.51 This
ruling was predicated upon the Texas Supreme Court holding in Drye v.
Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc. 52 which held that where a purchaser buys prop-
erty by reference to a plat or map which shows designated easements, and
the purchaser then spends money to make improvements thereon, the
seller cannot deny the easement's existence.53 In the present case, HL&P
had invested money in the installation of its equipment based upon the
representation that it was a public utility easement. The State was the
successor in title to the owners who dedicated the public utility easements
and the State acquired these lots subject to the dedicated easements.54
45. Id at 702.
46. I. (citing BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 412 (6th ed. 1990)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 703.
50. 925 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
51. ld at 315.
52. 364 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1963).
53. 1d at 209-210.
54. HL&P, 925 S.W.2d at 315.
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Therefore, HL&P was entitled to compensation for its relocation
expenses.
Laurel Land Memorial Park, Inc. v. Dallas Central Appraisal District55
presented a grave, but unanswered question of law. In Laurel Land the
court decided whether publicly dedicated cemetery property was exempt
from ad valorem taxation even though a for-profit corporation owned the
property. The cemeteries owned publicly dedicated land used or to be
used exclusively for human burial. Before 1992, the cemeteries had en-
joyed tax exempt status on their publicly dedicated cemetery property.56
But in 1992, the District ended its practice of exempting dedicated ceme-
tery property if a corporation chartered and organized for profit owned
the land and operated the cemetery. The cemeteries unsuccessfully pro-
tested the District's tax notices and appealed the review board's decision
to the district court. There, the cemeteries argued that the Texas Health
and Safety Code exempts dedicated cemetery property from taxation, re-
gardless of the cemetery owner's corporate character. Each party filed
motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the District's
motion in its entirety, agreeing with the District's position that under the
Texas Tax Code, the property was not exempt from taxation since the
property was held for profit.
Upon appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and
concluded that the property was exempt from taxation.57 Cemeteries his-
torically have received special favor under Texas law. In particular, the
Texas Constitution,58 the Texas Tax Code,59 and the Texas Health and
Safety Code, 60 recognize society's interest'in. protecting and preserving
places of burial. The court recognized that tension exists between the Tax
Code, 61 which provides that cemetery property held for profit is not ex-
empt from taxation, and the Health and Safety Code,62 which provides
55. 911 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied).
56. The tax exempt status applied only on property "in which at least one interment
had taken place or at least fifty percent of the burial spaces had been sold even if there had
not yet been an interment." Id. at 784-85.
57. l at 784.
58. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 2(a).
59. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.17 (Vernon 1992).
60. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.035 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
61. The Code states: "A person is entitled to an exemption from taxation of the prop-
erty he owns and uses exclusively for human burial and does not hold for profit." TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 11.17 (Vernon 1992).
62. The Health and Safety Code states:
(a) Property may be dedicated for cemetery purposes, and the dedication
is permitted in respect for the dead, for the disposition of remains, and in
fulfillment of a duty to and for the benefit of the public.(b) Dedication of cemetery property and title to the exclusive right of sep-
ulture of a plot owner are not affected by the dissolution of the cemetery
organization, nonuse by the cemetery organization, alienation, encumbrance,
or forced sale of the property.




for exemption of publicly dedicated cemetery property even if owned by
a corporation chartered for profit. In reconciling the two statutes, the
court began its analysis by pointing out that once a cemetery organization
publicly dedicated property, the organization could not use that property
for any purpose other than for human burial63 and the dedication may be
removed only through judicial proceeding.64 As you can see, the dedica-
tion fixes the property's use, thus meeting the first condition of the two
part test for tax exemption set forth in the Tax Code.65
To satisfy the second part of the Tax Code test, the court reviewed the
consequences upon the owner of dedicated property. Once public dedi-
cation fixes the property's use, the dedication also caused the property
not to be held "for profit," which is the second part of the Code's test for
tax exemption. 66 Public dedication of land for burial purposes effects an
abandonment of the land's use and possession for all purposes other than
burial.67 After public dedication a corporate owner retains only the legal
title to the dedicated property and its dominion over the land is extin-
guished since it no longer has the power to sell or convey the land for any
purpose other than burial. The court stated that
merely because the property ultimately may be sold for more money
than the owner paid for it does not mean the property is "held for
profit" . . . [therefore] as a matter of law the public dedication of
property for cemetery purposes causes the property to be held for
the sole purpose of burying the dead.68
As a result, the court found that the two prong test for tax exemption had
been satisfied and the cemetery property was exempt from ad valorem
taxation as a matter of law.69 The Supreme Court denied writ, so for all
practical purposes this matter has been laid to rest.
V. EASEMENTS
Daniel v. Fox7° contains a good discussion about easements. There
were many parties involved and the facts were such that it was almost
necessary to hire a schematic artist to assist in visualizing the circum-
(1) is exempt from public improvements assessments, fees, and public
taxation; and
(2) may not be sold on execution or applied in payment of debts due
from individual owners and plots.
(f) Dedicated cemetery property shall be used exclusively for cemetery
purposes until the dedication is removed by court order or until the mainte-
nance of the cemetery is enjoined or abated as a nuisance under Section
711.007.
TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.035 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
63. Laurel Land, 911 S.W.2d at 787.
64. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.036 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
65. See supra note 61.
66. Id.
67. Smallwood v. Midfield Oil Co., 89 S.W.2d 1086, 1090 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1935, writ dism'd).
68. Laurel Land, 911 S.W.2d at 787.
69. Id.
70. 917 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
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stances. Basically, in 1955 the owner of a large tract of land partitioned it
into five parcels running parallel to each other with each parcel being
divided by a creek. The owners of the subdivided parcels could not cross
to the other side of their property without using a road that ran along
both sides of the creek and crossed each of the other parcels of land. In
1974, Lydia Kothmann Fuchs deeded her tract to her sons, the Fox broth-
ers. Neither of the brothers lived on the property and eventually leased
the property to Uncle Silas Kothmann who already owned one of the five
parcels of land. The other owners also leased their tracts to Uncle Silas.
Uncle Silas turned over his property and the leased tracts to his son
Eldon Kothmann. In 1991, when the lease between the Fox brothers and
Eldon expired they elected not to renew the lease, choosing instead to
lease the tract to individuals for hunting purposes. Later that year, Eldon
demanded that the Fox brothers and the hunters discontinue use of both
roads and erected a fence to prevent entry onto his land. In 1992, the Fox
brothers filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that an easement ex-
isted, allowing use of the road on the east side of the creek.
During trial, all defendants acknowledged an easement in favor of the
Fox brothers on the west side of Beaver Creek. "At the conclusion of the
trial . . . the trial court awarded an 'implied easement by necessity' in
favor of [the Fox brothers] across all tracts on the east side of [the
creek.]" 71 The owner of the southernmost tract appealed, claiming that
the trial court ruling was unclear as to whether they granted an implied
easement or an easement by necessity. Upon appeal, the court concerned
itself not with the issue of whether the easement was implied or of neces-
sity, but instead focused on whether the easement arose by implication or
by way of grant to the dominant estate as a necessary means to ensure the
enjoyment of the estate where an easement was neither expressly re-
served nor granted.72 It was concluded that whether the easement arose
impliedly73 as a result of reservation by the dominant estate or by way of
necessity 74 to ensure the enjoyment of the estate, the elements of each
were identical and what was being alluded to was that it was an easement
by necessity regardless of how it arose. The evidence supported a finding
of unity of ownership of the dominant and servient estates prior to sever-
ance, the necessity of a roadway and the existence of such necessity at the
time the estates were severed.75 From this point on, the focus of the
71. Id. at 109.
72. Id. at 110.
73. An implied easement requires that "(1) there was unity of ownership of the domi-
nant and servient estates and that the use was (2) apparent, (3) in existence at the time of
the grant, (4) permanent, (5) continuous, and (6) reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of
their premises granted." Id. at 110 (citing Bickler v. Bickler, 403 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex.
1966)).
74. An easement by necessity requires "(1) unity of ownership of the dominant and
servient estates prior to severance, (2) the necessity of a roadway, and (3) that the necessity
existed at the time the estates were severed." Id. at 111 (citing Koonce v. Brite Estate, 663




court was on the degree of necessity required for an easement by neces-
sity as a result of an implied grant. The court stated that "[t]he doctrine
of strict necessity prohibit[ed] the imposition of a burden upon an estate
for the mere convenience of another estate. '76 In view of the evidence,
the court found that the Fox brothers had met their burden of showing
not only the required necessity but that the only other option was prohib-
itively expensive and therefore, the necessity shown by then was more
than for their mere convenience. 77
VI. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. PROPER PARTIES
In Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dis-
trict,78 the Supreme Court of Texas addressed the question of regulation
of water usage under the Edwards Aquifer Act (Act). 79 That Act regu-
lates the use of the primary source of water for residents in the south
central part of Texas. The Act's permit system established a preference
for the Edward's Aquifer's existing users. Appellees sought to enjoin ad-
ministration and enforcement of the Act, and the district court complied.
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the court addressed whether ap-
pellees had a vested interest in the water beneath their land,80 including
whether use of the water ran with the landowner or with the land. Appel-
lees argued that if use of the water ran with the landowner, the prefer-
ence to existing users would make the landowner unable to transfer the
land to future users, who would be unable to "bootstrap" their use to
prior owners, thus imparing their use.81 The court disagreed, holding that
the term "user" in the Act includes prior and future owners of land, thus
making the land freely transferrable. 82 In addition, a landowner could
show historical use of the property in establishing its water use permits,
thus making the land freely transferable and maximizing the amount of
available water for withdrawal.83
In Beutel v. Dallas County Flood Control District84 the court addressed
the question of who is a proper party in a condemnation action. The
Flood Control District authorized funds to purchase the subject property
for flood control purposes. One month later, the tract was purchased by
appellant Cross, who then sold the property to her son. Beutel then
purchased the property at a Sheriff's sale, which was brought about by a
judgment held by Beutel. In the Flood Control District's condemnation
76. Id. at 112.
77. Id. at 113.
78. 925 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1996).
79. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 626, § 1.06, 1993 Tex. Gen. Law 2355,
amended by Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 261, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2505.
80. Id. at 625.
81. Id. at 630.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 916 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, writ denied).
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proceedings, appellant Beutel intervened.8 5 The court of appeals deter-
mined that Beutel was not a proper party to the condemnation proceed-
ings.86 "The only parties entitled to a condemnation award are the
owners of the condemned property at the time of the taking. 87 Beutel
argued that he became an owner the day he abstracted his judgment
which led to the Sheriff's sale. In response, the Flood Control District
claimed that the taking occurred in 1984, seven years before Beutel
claimed to become an owner. The court rejected Beutel's claim that he
was a lienholder on that date, finding instead the Beutel had no owner-
ship interest on the taking date.88
B. DAMAGES
For the last two years, this Survey has dealt with the question of
Schmidt factors; that is, those compensable damages available to a land-
owner for remaining property following a taking.89 In State v. Heal,90
residents of Dallas had property condemned for the widening of South-
western Boulevard in conjunction with the expansion of North Central
Expressway. The Heals appealed the Special Commissioner's findings in
the State's condemnation petition, arguing that the condemnation would
increase traffic and cause a bottleneck in front of the remaining property,
which would impair access to that property. The court initially noted
that, under the Schmidt factors, "[h]ad the Heals sought damages merely
for increased traffic, increased noise, and the overall impact of the Cen-
tral Expressway project, their claims would be precluded" under the rule
that there could be no compensable damages to remainder property
caused by the acquisition and use of adjoining property. 91 The Heals,
however, sought compensation for the diminution in value of their prop-
erty caused from increased traffic and bottlenecks. Thus, Schmidt did not
preclude recovery for impaired access by a landowner.92
The Heal court also rejected the State's argument that impaired access
is a community injury. The court held that while circuity of travel is a
community injury, and thus noncompensable, impaired access is specific
to a particular property's use and is compensable. 93 After determining
that the Heals' claims were not precluded, the court turned to deciding
the ultimate question of impaired access, which is a question of law.94
The court, to permit recovery, must find that access rights have been ma-
85. Beutel has secured a judgment against the son, and the property was sold at the
Sheriff's sale in satisfaction of that judgment. Id. at 691.
86. Id. at 692.
87. Id. at 691 (citing City of Austin v. Capitol Livestock Auction Co., 453 S.W.2d 461,
463 (Tex. 1970)).
88. Id. at 692.
89. See State v. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1993).
90. 917 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. 1996).
91. Id. at 8.
92. Id.




terially and substantially impaired. Relying on DuPuy v. City of Waco,95
the seminal case on impaired access damages, the court determined that
the Heals had not suffered impaired access, which required essentially no
access, but rather only diminished access which is not compensable. 96
The court held that evidence that a new configuration would create con-
fusion, be more hazardous and result in difficulty turning left into the
Heals' property is evidence of inconvenience, not evidence of material
and substantial impairment. 97
In Oddo v. State98 a portion of property improved by a two-story office
building was condemned. The trial court excluded evidence as to the
value of the remaining property, holding the evidence was inadmissible
under Schmidt. The appellate court disagreed, stating that Schmidt only
barred evidence of damages which are noncompensable; that is, damages
from diversion of traffic, circuitousness, lessened visibility, inconvenience,
community damages, and damages from the use of the State's pre-ex-
isting right of way.99 Specifically, evidence that the property no longer
complied with zoning laws, had lost parking space, and had lost value due
to reconfiguration were admissible, as those were compensable
damages.100
Typically, when a portion of property is taken, the proper measure of
damages to the remainder is the diminution in value. The same is true
when only an easement interest is taken. The court in McClain v. Elm
Creek Watershed Authority'01 dealt with a "double partial-taking" case;
that is, the condemning authority took only an easement interest in a por-
tion of the landowner's property. In that instance, "the proper measure
of damages is the market value of the ... tract, considered as severed
land, before the taking, minus the value of the same tract, considered as
severed land, after the taking."' 0 2 Since the State's testifying expert did
not render an opinion based upon the value of the property as severed
land, the court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for fur-
ther proceedings.' 0 3
In Felts v. Harris County, 0 4 the court addressed the issue of noise dam-
ages. The Felts owned property in Harris County. The County decided
to build four-lane "major thoroughfare" that ran adjacent to the Felts'
property. The Felts put their home on the market before the construction
95. 396 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1965).
96. Heal, 917 S.W.2d at 10-11.
97. Id at 11. Following DuPuy and Heal, the court in Taub v. City of Deer Park, 912
S.W.2d 395 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ), on remand from the Supreme
Court of Texas, held that impaired access can be a special compensable damage, although
in Taub the landowners access was not materially and substantially impaired.
98. 912 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied).
99. It at 833.
100. Id. at 834.
101. 925 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
102. Id. at 759.
103. Id. at 760.
104. 915 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1996).
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opened and disclosed to potential purchasers the thoroughfare's pro-
posed location. The home sold for $55,000 less than the Felts were ask-
ing. The appellate court held that noise damages are sufficient to qualify
as compensable damage under the Texas Constitution. 105 An actual tak-
ing of physical appropriation is not required. 1' 6 The court did hold, how-
ever, that the noise damages suffered by the Felts were no different than
damages suffered by their neighbors, which qualified only as community
damages.'0 7 Since community damages are not compensable, the Felts
could not recover for noise damages.' 08
VII. ZONING
Zoning issues were not a major topic of discussion in the courts this
year, and there were only three cases of interest. In FM Properties Oper-
ating Co. v. City of Austin,109 the court considered the constitutional
question of whether the denial of approval for a subdivision plan was
arbitrary or capricious and therefore an unconstitutional taking. In 1987,
House Bill 4 was enacted requiring that applications for construction per-
mits be approved or disapproved under one set of local laws." 0 The City
of Austin adopted an interpretation of House Bill 4 that divided land
development activities into two series of permits-a series of permits for
subdividing unplatted raw land into legal lots and a series of permits for
vertical construction of improvements on existing legal lots. FM Proper-
ties acquired the property in question in June 1992. Two months prior to
that date, the previous owner filed thirteen applications for preliminary
subdivision plat approval with the City. These applications were the first
documents in the series of necessary permits for a subdivision project
which under House Bill 4 required that all remaining applications be
judged by the then existing 1991 ordinances. While these applications
were under consideration FM Properties filed their site plan. The site
plan was the first permit application in the series of permits required for
approval of construction on a subdivided property. FM Properties failed
to file all the necessary documents before the site plan expired and the
105. Id. at 484; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
106. Felts, 915 S.W.2d at 484.
107. Id. at 486.
108. Id
109. 93 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 1996).
110. House Bill 4 was codified in the Texas Government Code, which provides as
follows:
The approval, disapproval, or conditional approval of an application for a
permit shall be considered by each regulatory agency solely on the basis of
any orders, regulations, ordinances, rules, expiration dates, or other duly
adopted requirements in effect at the time the original application for the
permit is filed. If a series of permits is required for a project, the orders,
regulations, ordinances, rules, expiration dates, or other duly adopted re-
quirements in effect at the time the original application for the first permit in
that series is filed shall be the sole basis for consideration of all subsequent
permits required for the completion of the project.
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 481.143(a) (Vernon 1990 & Supp. 1997).
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city rejected the site plan application for that reason. In October 1993,
FM Properties refiled the site plan application. By that time, however,
the prior 1991 ordinance had been replaced.111 Because FM Properties'
original site plan application expired, the new ordinance governed the
subsequent filing of the refiled plan. FM Properties' refiled site plan did
not comply with the new ordinance and was therefore rejected. Suit was
filed against the City under the allegation that the City had violated FM
Properties' Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. A jury trial resulted
in a favorable finding for FM Properties.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that there was a single disposi-
tive issue, which was whether the City violated FM Properties' substan-
tive due process rights by denying the subsequent site plan application for
noncompliance with the new ordinance. The court began by discussing
the constitutional standard by which the City's conduct would be judged.
By established constitutional law, government action comports with sub-
stantive due process if the action is rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernment purpose. To show that the action is not rationally related to a
legitimate government activity requires that such government action be
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare. 11 2 The court concluded
that FM Properties' due process rights had not been violated. 113 The City
adopted its interpretation of House Bill 4 to guarantee that land develop-
ers would be made to comply with the most current standards at each
stage of development. Therefore, the City's policy was rationally related
to avoiding inferior and potentially hazardous construction and thus ad-
vance the city's health, safety, and welfare. 114
A similar case is Williamson Pointe Venture v. City of Austin. 115 In Wil-
liamson Pointe land was annexed by the City of Austin and zoned only for
houses, farms and ranches. The land's former owner applied for rezon-
ing, and in 1987 rezoning was approved 1 6 to use the land multifamily
dwellings and warehouse or light office purposes. A preliminary subdivi-
sion plan has been filed and approved in January 1985; unfortunately, the
property owner did not file for final plat approval and the plan expired in
September 1987. Williamson Pointe Venture acquired the property in
March 1992 and quickly filed a site plan application to avoid the environ-
mentally stringent requirements of the pending Austin Save Our Springs
referendum (SOS). However, this application was designed to comply
with the ordinance in effect at the time of rezoning, not the one in place
in 1992, prior to the SOS ordinance. Williamson Pointe also failed to file
a subdivision application to replace the expired one. The site plan appli-
cation was never approved and the SOS subsequently passed. Williamson
111. FM Properties, 93 F.3d at 171.
112. Id. at 174 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
113. Id. at 175-76.
114. Id. at 175.
115. 912 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ).
116. Austin City Ordinance No. 870326-A; see Williamson Pointe, 912 S.W.2d at 341.
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Pointe filed suit against the City claiming that it should have to comply
only with the standards existing at the time of rezoning. The trial court
found in favor of the City. Upon appeal, the court referred to the Texas
Government Code for guidance. The Government Code provided that if
a series of permits is required for a project, the ordinances in effect at the
time of the application for the first permit shall be the sole basis for the
consideration of all permits required for the project. 117 Therefore, the
relevant issue upon appeal was whether a grant of rezoning by the city
council constitutes a permit.
The court held that it did not. It reasoned that rezoning is a legislative
act 1 8 and did not fit the definition of a permit as an approval or authori-
zation for a project. 19 The court further reasoned that the city council is
not a regulatory agency which would normally issue permits. 120 The term
agency would normally apply to an agency of the executive branch of the
government, not a legislative body like the city council. Since the legisla-
ture did not include a city council in the definition of a regulatory
agency,12' and the word agency does not normally apply to a legislative
body, the court refused to consider the city council a regulatory agency
which would issue permits.122
West Texas Water Refiners, Inc. v. S & B Beverage Co.123 addressed
whether a board of adjustment (the Board) has the power to grant a spe-
cial exception when such exception is not explicitly spelled out in the or-
dinance. The zoning ordinance at issue created various commercial
districts. "A C-1 district expressly permit[ted] the operation of a 'retail
store"' with a "parenthetical exception that provide[d] for 'no second-
hand goods, beer or liquor.""'124 S & B handled the Texas alcoholic bev-
erage permits for Furr's Supermarkets. S & B applied to the Board for a
special exception to sell beer and wine for off premises consumption at
one of the Furr's grocery stores located in a C-1 district. West Texas
Water Refiners (WTWR) instituted suit seeking an injunction against S &
B Beverage and seeking a declaratory judgment that the Board's action
in granting the special exception was null and void. The trial court en-
tered judgment declaring that the special exception was not void.
The appeals court, in reversing the trial court, began its analysis with
the assertion that possible exceptions must be explicitly spelled out in the
117. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 481.143(a) (Vernon 1990).
118. Williamson Pointe, 912 S.W.2d at 343 (citing City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d
173, 175 (Tex. 1981)).
119. A permit is defined as a "license, certificate, approval, registration, consent, per-
mit, or other form of authorization required by law, rule, regulation, or ordinance that
must be obtained by a person in order to perform an action or initiate a project for which
the permit is sought." TEX. GOV'T CODE ArNN. § 481.142(2) (Vernon 1990).
120. Williamson Pointe, 912 S.W.2d at 343.
121. A regulatory agency is an agency, bureau, department, division or commission of
the state or any department or other agency of a political subdivision that processes and
issues permits. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 481.142(3) (Vernon 1990).
122. Williamson Pointe, 912 S.W.2d at 344.
123. 915 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
124. Id. at 625.
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ordinance itself, and a board of adjustment may not grant exceptions not
otherwise expressly provided for in the ordinance.125 The zoning ordi-
nance in question allowed two exceptions with regard to usage of prop-
erty. First, the Board could grant an exception for the extension of a
nonconforming use into different areas of a pre-existing building; that ex-
ception was inapplicable. Second, the Board could grant an exception for
a use conditionally allowed by the ordinance's provisions. If this second
statute did not apply, the allowed special exception was void. 126 The par-
ties stipulated that the provision was not ambiguous. The parties also
offered two possible interpretations of the provision and the impact of the
parenthetical reference. WTWR argued that the parenthetical reference
unambiguously prohibited products which could be sold; thus, beer and
wine were prohibited products in any store. Conversely, S & B argued
that the parenthetical reference only prohibited the types of stores in the
C-1 district (thus no beer stores or wine stores); grocery stores, however
could sell beer and wine. The court concluded that
[i]f the ordinance is unambiguous as stipulated and if the sale of beer
and wine is either permitted or prohibited as the parties allege, it
follows that the ordinance does not purport to allow the conditional
use of beer and wine sales to be determined at the discretion of the
Board. 127
Therefore, any special exception allowing such use under the conditional
use provision of the ordinance was void.128
VIII. LIENS/MECHANIC'S LIEN
During the Survey period the Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether a third party may be subrogated to a federal government tax
lien and thus, entitled to enforce such a lien against the taxpayer's home-
stead. Although the case of Benchmark Bank v. Crowder129 dealt with
homestead issues as well, the court primarily discussed the subrogation
question. Frank Crowder owned and operated a insurance agency of
which he was the sole officer, director and shareholder. When the IRS
assessed liens for his unpaid payroll taxes, Crowder and his wife signed a
promissory note payable to Benchmark Bank (the Bank) to pay off the
tax debt. The promissory note was secured by a deed of trust creating a
lien against the Crowder's homestead. The deed of trust also provided
that if the proceeds of the promissory note were used to pay any out-
standing lien the Bank would be subrogated to any and all rights of those
liens. The Bank foreclosed on the property after the Crowders defaulted
on the note. Thereafter, the Crowders sued the Bank for declaratory re-
125. Id. at 627.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 628.
128. Id.
129. 919 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. 1996).
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lief' 30 and damages for wrongful foreclosure. Both parties filed summary
judgment motions. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the Bank indicating that the deed of trust given by the Crowders created
a valid lien against their homestead pursuant to the deed of trust.131 The
court of appeals reversed the trial court's take-nothing judgment, con-
cluding that the Bank's attempt to obtain or enforce the IRS's tax lien
was precluded by the Texas Constitution. 132
Of the many issues involved in the case the Texas Supreme Court
stated that the principal issue was whether a third party may be subro-
gated to a federal government tax lien. Relying upon Staley v. Vaughn 133
for support, the court concluded that subrogation in these circumstances
was proper. 34 The court pointed out that the Staley case was not clearly
dispositive since there was no discussion of why the court in that case
found that subrogation was proper. But the Staley case, along with other
cases holding that "a third party who refinances a debt secured by a valid
mechanic's lien against a homestead may be subrogated to the lien," con-
vinced the court that such should be the case here as well.' 35 The court
stated that there was no difference between the refinancing of a debt se-
cured by a mechanic's lien and the refinancing of a debt secured by a
federal tax lien.' 36 "Once valid, the lien does not become invalid against
the homestead simply because the original debt has been refinanced,"
therefore, the Bank was contractually and equitably subrogated to the
IRS's tax lien against the Crowders. 37
In Hoarel Sign Co. v. Dominion Equity Corp.,138 the court dealt with
the doctrine of removables as it related to a mechanic's & materialman's
liens (M & M lien). Hoarel Sign Co. contracted with Hilton Investments
for the removal and installation of signs on a Hilton-owned building. The
building and land were encumbered by a pre-existing deed of trust in
favor of Caprock Savings and Loan Association. Hilton experienced fi-
nancial difficulties, which resulted in a default of the agreement between
Hilton and Hoarel and the foreclosure and sale of the building and prop-
erty to Dominion Equity Corporation. Hoarel then sued Dominion.
Hoarel acknowledged that it had not followed the proper procedures to
secure a statutory M & M lien, but claimed that they were entitled to a
constitutional M & M lien. Summary judgment was granted in favor of
130. "The Crowders sued ... seeking a declaration that (1) the lien granted by the deed
of trust was invalid, (2) the deed of trust did not authorize a nonjudicial foreclosure, and
(3) the foreclosure was wrongful." Id. at 659.
131. Id. at 659-60.
132. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (1876, amended 1973 and 1995).
133. 50 S.W.2d 907, 911-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1932, writ ref'd) (holding, with-
out discussion, that holder of deed of trust to secure payment of a federal income tax lien
was the owner of the lien and subrogated to the government's rights).
134. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d at 661.




138. 910 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. App.- Amarillo 1995, writ denied).
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Dominion. The appeals court in Amarillo reversed the trial court and
found that a material issue existed with regard to whether the sign fell
within the doctrine of removables. The doctrine indicates that an item is
removable if it can be detached from the building without materially in-
juring the remaining property. 139 An affidavit submitted by Hoarel indi-
cated that the sign was installed in such a fashion that it could be
removed without material injury to the land. 140 The court stated that if
such is the case then the Hoarel's mechanic's lien would have been supe-
rior to Dominion's pre-existing deed of trust.14' It was irrelevant whether
the lien was statutory or unconstitutional, since the doctrine of remove-
ables applied to both.' 42
IX. LANDLORD/TENANT
Where there's smoke, there's fire! Rao v. Rodriguez143 was a wrongful
death action in connection with a fire in which the smoke detector failed
to function because it lacked a battery. Rao appealed from a judgment
n.o.v., contending that he had both a statutory cause of action based upon
the smoke detector statute and a common law cause of action for negli-
gence. The apartment manager was responsible for making sure the
smoke detectors were operable at the time the premises were rented.
Prior to the fire Rao had never requested the manager or landlords in-
stall, inspect or repair the smoke detector in the Rao apartment. Reading
the statute, the court noted that "[a] landlord has liability under the
smoke detector statute if the landlord fails to install, inspect, or repair a
smoke detector within the time set forth in the statute."'144 However, this
obligation does not arise unless a request by the tenant to do so is made
and until further notice from the tenant that the tenant might exercise his
statutory remedies.' 45 Therefore, the court concluded that Rao was not
entitled to judgment against either the manager or landlord because he
never made a request or gave notice prior to the fire. 146 The court went
on to find that the liability provisions of the smoke detector statute were
an exclusive remedy as between tenant and landlord, therefore preclud-
ing any common law cause of action brought by Rao.' 47
One important case decided by the Supreme Court established the
duty a landlord owes to prevent criminal acts of third parties who are not
under the landowners' supervision or control. Walker v. Harris'48 was a
wrongful death case arising out of a fatal stabbing incident. The Walkers
139. Id. at 142 (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bodin Concrete Co., 869 S.W.2d
372, 382 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied)).
140. Id. at 143.
141. Id. at 142.
142. Id.
143. 923 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, no writ).
144. Id. at 180; see TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.259 (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 1996).
145. Rao, 923 S.W.2d at 180.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 924 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1996).
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owned and operated two separate fourplex apartment units in Brook-
shire, Texas. In 1990, Ronald Harris attended a party at one of the apart-
ments and was stabbed to death near one of the fourplexes. Neither
Harris nor his killer were tenants in the fourplex. The Harrises sued the
Walkers for negligence, alleging that the Walkers knew or should have
known that the area was located in a criminally active area. The Walkers
responded that although property owners may owe a duty to protect indi-
viduals from the criminal acts of third parties, they did not owe such a
duty in this case because the stabbing was not foreseeable. The court
stated that foreseeability requires only that the general danger, not the
exact sequence of events that produced the harm, be foreseeable.149 The
Walkers were entitled in summary judgment if they could show that vio-
lent crimial activity was foreseeable.' 50 The summary judgment evidence
indicated that the neighborhood was an area of low .to moderate crime
with no reports of violent crimes, no burglaries and few incidents of van-
dalism.15' This evidence established that the Walkers had no reason to
foresee the likelihood of violent criminal activity at their fourplex. Con-
sequently, the stabbing was not foreseeable as a matter of law.' 52
In Nalle v. Taco Bell Corp.153 the court of appeals ruled in favor of the
tenant when the landlord sued for breach of the lease. In 1976, Alan
Nalle's predecessor leased property to Taco Bell for use in the operation
of a Taco Bell franchise. The lease provided that Taco Bell "may use" the
premises for the purpose of conducting the business of a Taco Bell food
outlet or for any other legally permissible business or commercial ven-
ture. The rent was to be the higher of either $1,350 or five percent of
gross sales. In 1993, Taco Bell closed the restaurant and began using the
property as an equipment storage facility. Since he was no longer entitled
to income from the percentage of sales, Nalle filed suit and alleged that
Taco Bell had breached the lease. 154 Taco Bell moved for summary judg-
ment arguing that the words "may use" did not require it to continue
operating the premises as a restaurant. The trial court granted summary
judgment for Taco Bell.
On appeal, Nalle first argued that the lease expressly required that
Taco Bell "must" continue operating a restaurant on the lease premises.
The appeals court quickly ruled against Nalle's argument, pointing out
that "[tjhe word 'may' means possibility, permission, liberty or power; it
does not indicate a mandatory requirement.' 55 Nalle then argued that
the trial court should have implied a covenant of continuous operation in
the lease, thereby obligating Taco Bell to operate a restaurant on the
premises throughout the lease period. Again the court ruled against
149. Id. at 377.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 378.
153. 914 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied).
154. Id. at 686.
155. Id. at 687 (citing BLACKS LAW DIcTIONARY 979 (6th ed. 1990)).
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Nalle. Stating the general rule that courts should look only to the written
contract to discern the parties' obligations, the appeals court held that an
implied covenant is necessary only if the obligations were so clearly
within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary
to express it.15 6 The court relied heavily on Weil v. Ann Lewis Shops,
Inc.,157 where the court refused to imply a covenant of continuous opera-
tion because the lease had been extensively negotiated and the fixed
rental clause reasonably protected the lessor in case the lessee failed to
conduct a certain level of business.158 The court in Weil refused, as a
matter of law, to imply the covenant because it was not plainly necessary
to effectuate the intent of the parties nor obviously within their
contemplation. 5 9
Finally, the Nalle court also found it unnecessary to decide on the ap-
plication of a California case subscribing to an "adequacy" rule. That
rule would require that the court determine whether the agreed fixed
amount was adequate. The court held that the fixed minimum rental rate
covered Nalle's financial obligations, and was thus adequate as a matter
of law.' 60
Campos v. Investment Management Properties, Inc.161 considered the
rights of a landlord with regard to removing a tenant's property from the
premises pursuant to a writ of possession. After obtaining a writ of pos-
session, Investment Management Properties (IMP) along with two dep-
uty sheriffs, took possession of the premises in question. Under the
sheriffs's supervision, Campos' property was moved and placed on the
front lawn. Thereafter, Campos filed suit against IMP alleging conver-
sion and negligence for the destruction of his property as a result of rain.
The appeals court struck down all of Campos' arguments and imposed
sanctions against him for filing a frivolous appeal. The court held that
IMP did not convert Campos' property because it was legally authorized
to remove the property pursuant to a writ of possession. Further, IMP
was not negligent because it did not have a duty to care for the property
once it was removed from the premises. 162
X. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
Roberts v. City of Grapevine163 dealt with the causal connection neces-
sary to hold a city liable for a defect in a mandated crosswalk. Gerri
Roberts tripped and fell while walking down the steps of a pedestrian
crosswalk. The fall resulted in injuries to both of her ankles and she
brought suit against the City of Grapevine for premises liability. The pri-
156. Id at 687.
157. 281 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955, writ ref'd).
158. Id. at 655-56.
159. Id.
160. Nalle, 914 S.W.2d at 689.
161. 917 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
162. Id. at 354-355.
163. 923 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ requested).
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mary issue was whether the condition of the steps constituted a "special
defect" or simply an "ordinary premise defect,"' 164 which in turn deter-
mined the duty owned to Roberts by the City. The question was whether
the City must have actual knowledge or just reasonable knowledge of the
crosswalk's condition.165
Special defects are statutorily defined as "defects such as excavations
or obstructions on highways, roads, or streets."'1 66 The court noted that
"[a] condition can be a special defect without actually being on the road-
way if it is close enough to present a threat to the 'normal users of [the]
road.""'167 Evidence indicated that the steps were crumbling and cracked,
thus creating a hole in the step; the step was also and elevated, thus creat-
ing an unusually high first step. These facts, in addition to the fact that
the City mandated that the crosswalk be used as the only means of cross-
ing the street, dictated that the defect was special. Therefore the City had
a duty to warn of the condition, even if the City did not create that condi-
tion. The court added that to hold otherwise would encourage cities to
neglect their delineated crosswalks, because any injured party would have
to prove the city had actual knowledge of the defect as opposed to a
standard of ordinary care.168
164. Id. at 171.
165. If the defect amounts to a premises defect the city owes the same duty that a
private landowner owes a licensee. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022(a)
(Vernon 1986). If the defect amounts to a special defect, then the City owes Roberts the
same duty to warn that a private landowner owes invitee. See id. § 101.022(b). For and
ordinary premises defect, Roberts must prove that the City had actual knowledge of the
defects and she did not actually know of the condition. Roberts, 923 S.W.2d at 173.
166. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022(b) (Vernon 1986).
167. Roberts, 923 S.W.2d at 172 (citing State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v.
Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 238 n.3 (Tex. 1992)).
168. Id. at 173.
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